10: Schumacher--225 [4] T-1 (ca. 1896) 1898 Formosans
116, 596, 621

The Chinese live very much secluded by families, even in large towns, and have contact with other family units only through the official mediation of the head of each group concerned.

167 618 Professor Y. Tomita found that even though there were many villages which did not have the clan name as their place name, nevertheless each still retained one influential clan.[2] It is evident that settlement with kinsfolk was fairly common in early times.

5. Villages Formed by the People of the Same Native Town.

167 A survey made by the Japanese administration in 1926 revealed that a great number of villages in Formosa were formed by Chinese immigrants from the same native town on the Mainland. This type of settlement was more general than the clan village.

Both the clan village and the village consisting of the people of the same native town were highly homogeneous. As time passed, heterogeneous elements gradually increased. If the village was located in some place convenient for commerce and transportation, the heterogeneous elements rapidly grew. In the meantime, in response to the current social situation, the village community became the basic unit of social life, whether it derived from a clan village or from a village consisting of the people of the same native town.

6. The Function of the Village.

•621 In pre-modern China, governmental administrative activity practically ended at the prefecture level. Most local affairs were left to the local community in the village and town, except

2. Ibid., pp. 176-188. Tomita's study was based on census report of 1930.

621 for tax collection, conscription and cases of capital crime which were handled directly by the prefectural government. In this respect the situation in Formosa under the Manchu regime was the same as that on the Mainland. Within the village, the elder was elected, and approved by the local government. He had some assistants under him. Public affairs and minor crimes were decided and disposed of by the village elders. At times the new settlers drew up rules for the administration of local affairs, and affairs for common interest were discussed and decided upon by the council of householders.

648 631 669 Manchu control of Formosa was always tenuous. Uprisings were frequent, and after the first quarter of the 18th century internecine wars occurred incessantly. As the government was not strong enough to keep peace and order, self-defense was left to kinship groups or groups of the people of the same native town. In this situation the influential kinship group was very significant. If it was strong, not only could it defend its kinsmen better, but it could even suppress other groups and enjoy various privileges. A strong clan insured survival and prosperity, and this was the reason why an abur 'ance of male descendants became the ideal of life among the Formosan Chinese. This [161] may account for the enormous rate of natural growth of Formosa's population which is still going on unabated. On the other hand, for defense against raids of aborigines and pirates, even the influential clan had to get the co-operation of other people. This led to territorial consolidation within the village.

52:Barclay S-5 (no date)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

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Furthermore, higher officials were themselves aliens, responsible ultimately to the Manchu court. Their tenure depended on their standing in Peking. Special competence or energy in office was not an advantage—it could even be dangerous, by making them targets of rumor and innuendo. Careers were sometimes ruined on the suspicion that certain officials had separatist leanings or were friendly to foreigners. Personnel were transferred regularly, as in China, to remove them from temptations of familiarity with their offices. Their only safe path to success was to maintain stability in local affairs, and somehow to prevent civil discontent from turning into civil disturbance.

This system was calculated to engross its key officers in their personal relations with Peking. It proved to be more effective in ensuring loyalty than in promoting careful government or preventing corruption. There were few deterrents to peculation in office, which was respectable if prudently pursued, and surrounded by many opportunities—such as legal monopolies and illicit export trade—not present in China itself.

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These limited and negative objectives of government invited continual lapses of internal rule. Being unfamiliar with local conditions, officials simply did not govern in rural villages. Throughout the countryside they kept the peace by intrigue with powerful families rather than through actual administration—families that relied heavily on property obligations among the peasantry to uphold their influence. The situation put a strain on the administration's own underpinnings, and led to severity in abuses and civil strife to which the mainland itself was unaccustomed. It is a testimony to the serviceability of traditional Chinese institutions that they survived this test.

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Whatever its internal shortcomings, this scheme of political order was well suited to rebuff foreigners, at least foreigners whose advances were not backed by force. Acute frustration among the Western commercial agents in Taiwan stands as evidence that it was accomplishing this part of its purpose. They complained bitterly that officials had connived at Taiwanese violence against Europeans and had even incited such incidents.[3]

The best information available about Taiwan's external contacts is contained in the published reminiscences and travel accounts of foreign trading representatives. The literary interests of these men throw light on the main preoccupation of their trading activities.

[3] For example, see Pickering, W. A. (1898), Ch. 17.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 ADl Formosa ADl

this nominal government policy existed within Taiwan's rural villages. The bulk of the population was made up of peasant farmers and small tradesmen, who supplied the commodities for most of the export trade. The fact that their products were exported did not bring them into closer touch with outside markets. Farming and other village activities did not reach beyond local boundaries; the arrangements for disposing of farm produce, as we have seen, were in different hands.

The rural population led a settled existence. Taiwan being a small area, travel between places was not uncommon, but it was rare for families to change residence from one part to another. With poor roads and chronic banditry, even minor journeys entailed some hardship and risk and so were undertaken chiefly for exceptional purposes. The same difficulties hindered the movement of commodities. Internal markets had not been very effectively developed to transfer articles of ordinary use from town to town; reports tell of wide variation in prices for standard items such as food, and of prohibitive hazards to products in transit.[5] Often products could be shipped to the coast and on to China more easily than to points elsewhere in the island.

Local stability fostered local solidarities. The inconvenience of communication helped rural settlements to become close-knit communities, by segregating certain cleavages and antagonisms that the Chinese had brought with them from the mainland. Many had come from different localities in Fukien and Kwangtung, and had maintained their ancestral clan affiliations. Members of these groups frequently settled together and did not intermarry with others. Even many years after annexation by Japan, the Japanese found that several communities had kept themselves free of mixture with other groups. For these various reasons, village organization in many respects became self-contained and self-sufficient.[6]

Property institutions helped to buttress the stability in these small communities. In Taiwan, as in China, land ownership was the only durable form that substantial wealth could take. It was durable

[5] Takekoshi, Yosaburo (1907), pp. 252 and 269-270.

[6] The turbulent history of Taiwan has been carelessly represented as one of indiscriminate civil disorder, its early population as "unruly." It is noteworthy that most of the disturbances apparently followed the lines of cleavage above. Far from portending a breakdown of tradition within the Chinese settlements, these incidents were contests of strength between distinct parties—powerful clans, government forces, and aboriginal tribes. None was directed against the form of the social order itself, and none ever threatened that order.

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spread local support. Their program to govern the countryside directly was a recognized failure as early as 1898.[10]

Starting with the issuance of *pao-chia* regulations in that year, the policy was revised with a view to getting less ambitious results, but more quickly. These were rules of conduct imposed on inhabitants of villages and smaller towns, under the threat of punitive action against the whole community. Virtually all Taiwanese outside the Aborigine Territory (with special provisions applying to certain cities) were assigned to household groups (*chia*), which were in turn grouped into village units (*pao*) for supervision. Responsibility for law observance and public order was allotted jointly among the households of each village. Positions of authority, carrying explicitly defined duties, were conferred on heads of prominent (i.e., wealthy and influential) families.

The system was based on a shrewd practical knowledge of those customary obligations that were most binding among Taiwanese. It was a move toward fitting the treatment of opposition to its roots instead of to its symptoms. By making the regulation of villages follow lines of kinship and property, these measures in effect were insinuated into the indigenous social structure of the population.

The rules placed a multitude of specific duties upon each *chia* as a group. The *chia*, through its head, was responsible for reporting all events such as births and deaths occurring within it, for reporting and controlling all movements of persons in and out of its area along with the conduct of the permanent residents; it put into effect the earnest health and sanitation rules that were often promulgated; it mobilized labor from its ranks for road-building and irrigation projects as directed from above; it was required to disseminate instructions for crop improvement and soil maintenance, bearing its own expenses; it supplied men for auxiliary police service, supported its own school facilities, assessed fines among its members, collected many taxes, and could be called upon to enforce additional rules decreed by prefectural governors.[11] These latter features in fact proved so attractive in avoiding the costs of more formal administration that the Japanese kept the regulations in full force throughout the entire span of their rule.

[10] Yanaihara, Tadao (1929), pp. 220-223.

[11] See OPNAV, Civil Affairs Handbook, *Takao Province* (1944), pp. 49-51; also Hsü Shih-wei (1946), p. 160 ff. This latter author calls the *pao-chia* system "the most effective instrument for destroying organized Chinese resistance to the Japanese."

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The arrangement had more than savings in the expenses of civil government to recommend it. It gave the new regime a channel of authority reaching into every village, however small. Perceiving the value of this, the Japanese took care not to let the system lapse through neglect. They kept a close watch over its functioning by means of a large and reliable force of their own police. More important, by insisting on rigorous enforcement of the regulations, they launched the *pao-chia* organization into full-scale and sustained operation from the beginning.[12] With the supervision of a trusted constabulary, it functioned through the medium of prior obligations and loyalties that were already present in every community, without the need to nurture affection for the central regime among the population.

Such a system—when it works—is a most efficient way of maintaining peace and order in a society already strongly bound by local custom. The Japanese originally adopted it as an improvement over the use of force, but never abandoned coercion in its operation. They merely utilized the structure of *pao* and *chia* to apply sanctions against wrongdoing more selectively and less frequently. Penalties fell on those persons in positions to exercise a deterrent influence on others.

As a further by-product, the refined coercive aspect helped to lessen the rewards that had to be granted for Taiwanese collaboration. This was important, for in rural areas such a form of control lends itself readily to keeping the avenues to individual betterment within an accustomed scope.[13] The impressive agricultural improve-

[12] A system like this one can function only where there are strong local solidarities. It turns communities into separate compartments for administration. This fact may be responsible for some of its success in maintaining order, for it inhibits organized opposition to established government from growing to any large scale. But the considerable success of the *pao-chia* system in Japanese hands cannot be accounted for by these divisive effects. They were also present in Nationalist and Imperial China, and there only helped to divide the society so far that no central administration was possible.

The essential difference was that in Taiwan the Japanese adopted it as an opportunity not for avoiding local government, but for effectuating central control over local affairs. Besides using it to enforce a minimum degree of legal conformity, they intermixed a host of other functions already alluded to. In addition, the Japanese incorporated a regular scheme of favors to be bestowed on active collaborators, in the nature of education, business opportunity, and appointment to government posts, and thus by-passed the usual effect of family connections in filling lower positions of authority.

[13] In later years many educated Taiwanese protested, and correctly so, that it worked as a levelling mechanism to impede all of them from rising very far above the status of peasants. In order to serve a central government at all, and not be merely a loose alliance of towns and villages, such a system must offer inducements to a gentry class for cooperation: this complaint by frustrated persons with schooling should properly be

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632 621 ments, health program, and construction for public works all depended on generous amounts of labor. Without such cheap incentives to mobilize this labor, these projects could not have been pursued so effectively.

As obvious as these advantages of "indirect rule" may be, it should be as clear that it is a poor vehicle for introducing social change. The more it is used to wield authority, the stronger and more resistant to change it can become; the more it is undermined by altering local relationships that sustain it, the less remains of its usefulness. Hence, from adoption of this scheme initially as an expedient to "pacify" the island, Japanese authorities acquired a positive interest in preserving the same set of agrarian institutions that had existed in Taiwan before their arrival.

Thus they abandoned the idea of reorganizing the rural society—primarily because they tried and failed, but also because as it stood it gave them the best access to regulation of the agricultural population and farming practices. It was in some respects a ready-made instrument for exerting the necessary control with the least disturbance of customary affairs, having in the past enabled the various parties to the export trade to prosper at the expense of farmers. For better coordination of their policies, Japanese gradually did erect a more formal type of government administration, but the basis of the system in rural areas was not greatly affected by this modification.

The Impact of Improvements in Agriculture

185 The Japanese who were charged with remodeling Taiwan's economy gave first priority to long-range investments around the fringes of agriculture. The rural economy was already geared to exchange food and related products for special capital services. Certain of these services were soon altered under Japanese influence. Positions that provided them, or that could usurp them, gradually began to be occupied by Japanese nationals—official, private, and always an indistinct class in-between that wielded quasi-official sanctions.

311 242 Those innovations that worked their way into agriculture were directed chiefly to raising crop yields per unit of tilled land. Another avenue of increasing the total agricultural product was by extending

construed as a lament that there were few opportunities for advancement outside the rural villages and towns dominated by petty gentry. Discontent from this source bore few signs of being the awakening of a popular movement for independence among the Taiwancse, as it is sometimes represented. See Hsü Tze-wei (1946), p. 161 ff.

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have always supplied a large part of the Taiwanese diet. How well these three basic crops represent the whole of Taiwanese agriculture may be seen from their share in the total recorded value of farm produce (see Fig. 4).[18]

The spatial arrangement of crops discussed in the previous chapter has an important bearing on the question of persistence in organization of agriculture. Rice fields were found throughout the flat lowland area, overlapping in every civil division with the other types of farming. In its import for the nature of the rural society, this fact overshadows most effects of diversification and rationalization of farming. The types of social system that can give rise to paddy cultivation of rice seem to be uncommonly well equipped to resist change. They are centered around settled family relationships that provide for uninterrupted use of suitable fields over many generations. This is the case throughout most of the paddy-rice areas of Asia, where these conditions resemble what is to be found in Taiwan.[19] Hence, from this stability within farming itself, one should not expect to find that its social setting was greatly different as a result of Japanese occupation.

Changes in Pattern of Employment

Farming is so important to Taiwan that it has first been treated separately, with very little reference to its place among other activities. By viewing it in relation to the pursuits of the entire working population, we can take into account the nature of alternative opportunities outside of agriculture.

There would not be much point in looking for possibilities of non-agricultural employment if the economy could not have supported a larger proportion of people in other activities. This is where many agrarian countries have felt the effect of poverty to stand in the way of their industrial progress. From the start of its modern era, Taiwan's peculiar status as a food exporter suggests that food supply was no barrier. Since that time, special diligence in the matter made land and human effort more effective in producing crops. Advancing both of these aspects of productivity implied that at least some movement of people to pursuits outside of agriculture was economically feasible.

[18] These trends, of course, indicate nothing about "well-being" of farmers, since large capital charges (for irrigation, fertilizer, and government administration) were being made against farm incomes.

[19] See Taeuber, Irene B. (1947), pp. 21-43.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Hsin Hsing, Village in Change

In the preceding chapters we have seen how the Hsin Hsing villager, a peasant who was tied to the land and the village community and primarily involved in a basically subsistence type of agriculture, is being transformed to one who is becoming more and more involved in the market economy of the country and who has widespread contacts with an urban way of life. We have seen how such developments are affecting village social organization, community and kinship solidarity, and some of the general patterns of village life. We have also seen that although many features of traditional Chinese culture are still evident in the Hsin Hsing village area (especially in the realm of religion, which continues to be a source of community unity), the impact of increased urbanization in Taiwan in recent decades has brought about important and rather rapid socioeconomic and cultural changes. This has been especially marked in the roles of the village and kinship organizations that were previously the peasants' chief sources of identification and security. We now turn to a description of modifications and changes in traditional values and behavior that further indicate the inexorable direction of change in Hsin Hsing.

Social change is not new to Chinese society. It has been going on for a long time in Taiwan, as well as on the mainland of China, as a consequence of the continuing process of urbanization. However, the process in Taiwan has been accelerated as a direct result of Japanese rule followed by the present rule of the Nationalist Chinese government.

Until the early part of this century, rural society in Taiwan had been relatively stable for many years. Population growth was slow, and there was enough land for the people. Members of the economic families had close relationships with the village as a community as well as with their localized kinship groups. As long as communications were poor, banditry a constant danger, and mobility limited, village unity was essential to security and even survival. Cohesive, tightly knit single *tzu* villages were quite powerful and frequently the de facto govern-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Formosa AD1

ment of the local area. In such villages, composed of a single large *tsu* organization, the *tsu* could virtually control the lives of its members, families, unite the entire village population on the basis of common kinship, and thus furnish security to all its members. But even villages like Hsin Hsing, fragmented into many small kinship groups, found their security in complete identity with the village, which made it possible for them to band together and cooperate for mutual security against the everday dangers and problems.

The coming of the Japanese at the end of the nineteenth century saw the introduction of a strong central government which led to an increased orderliness of life. The Japanese also introduced an expanded and efficient system of communications and public health and sanitation measures. These measures, coupled with a stable and secure life, made possible a radical increase in population which became even more pronounced in the late 1940's and 1950's under the Nationalist Chinese government. As all of these developments took place, particularly the maintenance of local order, the ties of the village began to loosen with the loss of its protective function and ability to initiate control beyond its own village boundaries.

In Hsin Hsing (and probably other villages like it), some of the numerous kinship groups began to increase in size and develop into *tsu* organizations as described in Chapter 5. With growth, each group became increasingly concerned with its own sociopolitical influence within the village and even in the nearby area, especially as the former imperative necessity for village unity declined. Thus, Hsin Hsing began to develop into a village with several significant competing *tsu* organizations which started, to some degree, to undercut the formerly necessary coalition of the different village kinship groups. So began the weakening of Hsin Hsing village as a unified community.

As the population increase continued in recent decades, and an already developing problem of land scarcity became even more extreme, it gradually became both necessary and possible for increasing numbers of rural villagers to migrate to the growing cities to find work to supplement their insufficient income from the land. This migration has broadened the villagers' urban contacts and relationships beyond the village. At about the same time, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the villagers have become increasingly more dependent upon and involved with the greater market economy. This has become especially true as patterns of land use have changed in response to all of the changing conditions, so that many villagers are increasingly shifting from what was primarily a subsistence form of agriculture to what is now participation in the market economy of the country. Therefore, there has been an acceleration of the impingement on the village by the outside world.